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ABSTRACT
During a disaster scenario, situational awareness informa-
tion, such as location, physical status and images of the sur-
rounding area, is essential for minimizing loss of life, injury,
and property damage. Today’s handhelds make it easy for
people to gather data from within the disaster area in many
formats, including text, images and video. Studies show that
the extreme anxiety induced by disasters causes humans to
create a substantial amount of repetitive and redundant con-
tent. Transporting this content outside the disaster zone can
be problematic when the network infrastructure is disrupted
by the disaster.
This paper presents the design of a novel architecture called
CARE (Content-Aware Redundancy Elimination) for better
utilizing network resources in disaster-affected regions. Mo-
tivated by measurement-driven insights on redundancy pat-
terns found in real-world disaster area photos, we demon-
strate that CARE can detect the semantic similarity between
photos in the networking layer, thus reducing redundant trans-
fers and improving buffer utilization. Using DTN simula-
tions, we explore the boundaries of the usefulness of deploy-
ing CARE on a damaged network, and show that CARE can
reduce packet delivery times and drops, and enables 20-40%
more unique information to reach the rescue teams outside
the disaster area than when CARE is not deployed.
1. INTRODUCTION
During disaster events, such as fires, floods and earth-
quakes, situational awareness (SA) information is critical
for victims and rescue workers to make well-informed de-
cisions. SA information can include many things, such as
location information (of fires, floods, damaged homes), the
status of the disaster (e.g., fire temperature, flood water lev-
els), resource information (e.g., rescue, medical, water and
food resources), and the status of individuals (e.g., health
monitoring, distress calls). It is essential to gather data from
inside a disaster area and deliver it to a service where it can
be aggregated, processed and effectively shared. Recently
we have witnessed an upsurge in the use of online social
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networks, such as Twitter [24] and Facebook [38], as well as
the emergence of new Web-based applications [6, 1, 22, 28,
8] that can both assist victims and enable ordinary citizens to
involve themselves in the emergency response effort. A key
contributing trend to these new applications is that everyday
devices such as smartphones and laptops enable ordinary cit-
izens inside a disaster zone to gather critical information in a
variety of formats, including text, images, audio and video.
These emerging applications, and uses of online social
networks for SA, assume that those inside the disaster zone
can actually connect to the Internet. All too often this is
not the case because the usual communication infrastructure
can be compromised by the disaster [14, 11, 20, 34]. Both
Louisiana and Mississippi suffered significant loss of Inter-
net access after hurricane Katrina; with some towns remain-
ing unreachable for prolonged periods of time [20]. Reports
of the Haiti earthquake reveal that Haiti’s telecommunica-
tions infrastructure was destroyed, leaving the country with
spotty mobile connections, no Internet connectivity and lit-
tle power in the first days after the earthquake [5]. Moreover
it took nearly one month to recover to 50% of its original
capacity [11]. Studies of disasters show that telecommuni-
cations often fail during disasters as a result of destruction
of components, infrastructure, and network congestion [34].
Thus, a key challenge in supporting these emerging applica-
tions is to manage the flow of SA data, coming from inside
a disaster zone, when connectivity to the Internet may be
disrupted or intermittent for extended periods of time.
At the same time, studies show that in response to extreme
anxiety caused by disasters, humans tend to want to commu-
nicate continuously, resulting in repetitive information [25].
When victims send “I’m OK" messages, or a photo of their
burning house, repeatedly to everyone they know, a lot of
redundant content is created and transmitted. A user under
duress is unlikely to carefully cull out such duplicate con-
tent; instead she would send all the photos to her friends,
family, and online SA service. Similarly, a crowd in front
of an exploding building can result in different people gen-
erating the same content. The ease with which users can
gather SA content today and share it with their friends only
exacerbates the potential for redundant content. This natural
behavior aggravates the problem of limited connectivity, and
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leads to congestion and inefficient use of shared communi-
cation, storage, and power resources.
In this paper, we address the problem of enabling SA ap-
plications to work properly in the face of network disrup-
tions and congestion due to content redundancy. We con-
sider scenarios in which people inside the disaster zone can
exchange information they collect via ad hoc networking.
Opportunities to upload this content to SA applications on
the Internet arise either when people or rescue vehicles have
an opportunity to leave the disaster zone and reach a place
where they can connect to the Internet, or when connectivity
inside the disaster zone is temporarily restored. We thus pro-
pose to use the Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) stack on
mobile phones and laptops because DTN enables this carry-
store-forward paradigm.
Beyond the vision of articulating the challenges and op-
portunities that arise in this class of emerging networking
applications, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We demonstrate the semantic redundancy in photo datasets
from real disasters. We do so by a careful manual label-
ing process in discussion with experts who have acted as
first-responders in actual disasters (Section 2).
• We propose to use computer vision algorithms in the for-
warding path to identify similar images, and thus describe
an architecture that augments DTN forwarding with content-
aware reduction algorithms. Our architecture allows re-
dundancy to be detected both on a single device and across
different devices (e.g., two people photographing the same
scene) (Section 3).
• We design and implement a hybrid approach for detect-
ing similar images that uses measurement-driven insights
to combine three state-of-art computer vision algorithms
to balance the tradeoffs between accuracy and computa-
tional cost (Section 4).
• Using a DTN simulator [19], we explore the benefits that
an architecture like CARE can provide under a range of
operating scenarios (Section 5). We find that CARE can
improve the amount of unique information delivered out-
side the disaster area by 5–40% depending upon the con-
ditions. Moreover, CARE delivers this information with
up to 40% reduced latency. If this saves even a few lives,
it would be a huge win.
2. REDUNDANCY IN DATA FROM
DISASTER-AFFECTED REGIONS
In this section, we analyze two real-world image datasets
generated by people inside a disaster zone and quantify the
extent and nature of redundancy found in these datasets. The
results motivate the need for semantic or content-aware tech-
niques in the network layer for identifying redundant content
in contrast to prior byte- or data-level techniques.
1. San Diego fire (SDfire). This dataset contains 84 pic-
tures taken by a professional photographer who wandered
around one of the affected towns both during the fire
event in 2007 and afterwards [3]. The pictures depict
a variety of scenes including burning homes, damaged
homes and cars, firefighters, policemen, etc. This dataset
serves as an example of the type of data and redundancy,
that could be generated by a single individual.
2. Haiti earthquake. This dataset contains 415 pictures taken
during and after the Haiti earthquake in January 2010
by the volunteers of an organization called Team Rubi-
con [9]. Team Rubicon sends small teams, of roughly
10 people that are primarily medical staff, into disaster
zones. The photos cover a wide range of subjects in-
cluding wounded people, damaged buildings, rescue ve-
hicles (jeeps, helicopters), victims trapped under rubble,
the medical staff, the service stations, street scenes, fa-
mous buildings, and crowd formations of victims.
2.1 Identifying and Quantifying Redundancy
In both datasets, just perusing the data suggested that there
were several pairs of similar images. We also saw instances
of 3 photos, or even 4 photos that were similar. To objec-
tively evaluate the extent of redundancy or how automated
techniques perform, we need a notion of ground truth. Thus,
we decided to manually label the data ourselves and built a
web-based tool to facilitate the labeling procedure. Our tool
lets the labeler view two images at a time and allows her to
rate the similarity of the two images on a scale from 0 to 5; 0
being not similar and 5 denoting extremely similar (typical
Likert scale [4]).
The notion of “similar" or “redundant" (which we use in-
terchangeably) is difficult to define precisely. Some cases
are straightforward, e.g., two photos of the same scene where
they differ in focus, luminance or resolution. However, con-
sider a more complex scenario. Suppose photos A and B
show the same person in different backgrounds (say differ-
ent places on the same block), and this person appears safe.
If the goal of the situational awareness application is merely
to find people, or to report whether or not people are ok, then
these two images can be considered redundant. However if
the goal is to track a person’s movements, then the two pho-
tos are not redundant. Similarly, if the background contains
a burning house in one image but not in the other, and the
application evaluates where help is needed, then these two
images are not redundant. It becomes clear that the notion
of similarity is subjective, and more importantly, ultimately
depends upon the “intended use" of the data. Recall that our
focus is on situational awareness applications, and their goal
includes things like enabling victims to find out where help
is located, or where road blocks exist, or for rescue workers
to know which houses are on fire.
Because the notion of similarity is hard to specify pre-
cisely, even for manual labeling, we consulted experts who
have experience in disaster events. We worked with mem-
bers of the City of Berkeley’s Disaster and Fire Commission,
and the local Amateur Ham Radio Club [7], who help local
neighborhoods during fire and earthquake events. They la-
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beled the data themselves, and also trained two of us on how
to do so. We treat two images as similar if the average score
of all four labelers is at least 3.
Although images are labeled pairwise, when 3 redundant
images are found to be all pairwise similar, only one of them
needs to be transmitted. However, that the notion of similar-
ity is not necessarily transitive. That is, the labeler marked
imagesA,B andB,C were similar butA,C were not. Given
these considerations, we define the notion of a maximally
similar set for quantifing the redundancy in a dataset.
Let S be the set of all images. Formally, Si ⊆ 2S is max-
imally similar if ∀pj , pk ∈ Si, similar(pj , pk) and ∀pl /∈
Si,∃pi ∈ Si,notsimilar(pi, pl). Intuitively, sending one
image p ∈ Si should suffice to represent the perceptual con-
tent in this set. Note that this definition handles both con-
cerns raised above; sets of more than two images with pair-
wise similarity and cases where the similarity is not transi-
tive.
Then, we quantify the amount of redundancy using the
notion of a minimum set cover over the maximally similar
sets. That is, C ⊂ 2S covers the information contained in
S if ∀Si,∃p, p ∈ C ∧ p ∈ Si. If C∗ is the minimum set
cover, we quantify the redundancy in S as 1 − |C∗||S| . To see
why this is an intuitively reasonable notion, consider the two
extreme examples: if all the images were duplicates of the
same source image the redundancy would be N−1N and if all
images were unique then the redundancy would be 0. Using
this definition and our labeled data, SDfire dataset has 53%
redundancy, and the Haiti dataset has 22% redundancy. This
means that sending less than half the photos in the SDfire
data, we can convey all of the unique information.
2.2 Do Byte-Level Methods Suffice?
A natural question is whether existing byte-level compres-
sion methods can capture the redundancy in these datasets.
We consider two methods – gzip-based compression and chunk-
level compression [32, 15]. For gzip, since each image is
already in a compressed encoding, we consider compressing
the entire set of images (i.e., tar + gzip). For the chunk-based
compression, we vary the chunk size to explore the tradeoff
between chunk size and redundancy.
Method Haiti SDfire
tar+gzip 7.7% 5%
Chunk-based, 64B 2.2% 0.9%
Chunk-based, 512B 0.67% 0.04%
Chunk-based, 2KB 0.6% 0%
Ideal/Content-Aware 22% 53%
Table 1: Redundancy elimination gained using different
methods on the Haiti and SDfire datasets.
Table 1 shows that existing byte-level approaches cannot
capture the redundancy in the two image datasets from dis-
aster scenarios. The main reason that these byte-level ap-
proaches fail is that images that are visually similar have
many small photometric differences, causing their byte-level
encoding to be very different.
This result shows that while this is a non-trivial oppor-
tunity to leverage redundancy elimination for reducing net-
work load in disaster regions, directly applying existing tech-
niques does not work. We note that both datasets capture a
lower bound of redundancy, as these are taken by users un-
der stress. Photos taken by people in real stress are likely to
exhibit higher redundancy, hence enable better compression
ratios than evaluated in this section.
3. CARE ARCHITECTURE
This section highlights two key design choices of CARE.
First, we observe that defining a network architecture for
disaster response presents a set of unique challenges. It is
hard to estimate both the degree of damage to the infrastruc-
ture and the network demands given that all traffic and us-
age models derived during normal operating conditions are
not valid or applicable. Consequently, we envision the use
of techniques from delay tolerant networking (DTN) [19].
Second, our previous measurements indicate opportunities
for reducing the network load using content-aware redun-
dancy elimination. Thus, we describe how traditional DTN
protocols can be augmented with content-aware strategies.
3.1 Setting
The typical response in disaster-affected regions is to de-
ploy mobile infrastructure that temporarily patches the dam-
aged infrastructure. An example of such infrastructure is
based on COWs (Cell-on-wheels) that are transported with
trucks (or even air-lifted in extreme cases) and provide cel-
lular phone coverage over the disaster area [10]. Given the
limited bandwidth, these systems are usually restricted to
first responders and do not allow access to the general popu-
lation. In contrast, we are interested in supporting the com-
munication needs of regular citizens. Our vision is that cit-
izens impacted by the disaster will be able to use the same
smartphones or laptops they use during everyday life.
Connected 
area 
Disconnected 
disaster zone 
Internet 
Rescue 
vehicle 
DTN Routing 
DTN Messages 
Redundancy 
Elimination 
TCP / UDP 
IP 
Layer 2 
Figure 1: Example of a typical disaster scenario. Nodes in
the disaster region may have intermittent opportunities for
external connectivity (e.g., a rescue vehicle).
Consider the scenario in Fig. 1, where there is no network
infrastructure available to users inside the area impacted by
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the disaster. Users can reach any destination on the Internet
as long as they manage to get their messages out of the dis-
aster area, via a device that can get in and out of the disaster
area, which in the figure is the rescue vehicle. Inside the im-
pacted area the only possible communication between users’
devices is via ad-hoc or pairwise contact opportunities.
We assume that a variety of devices (cellular phones, smart-
phones, laptops) will be present in the disaster area. The de-
vices will have a heterogeneous set of network capabilities
(WiFi, bluetooth), compute power (ranging from low power
embedded devices to multi-core processors), storage capac-
ity (from the 100s of Mbytes of a regular phone to the 100s
of GBytes of a laptop) and battery life (from a few hours to
days). In practice, this means that nodes can establish point-
to-point communications, store large amounts of informa-
tion and are capable of processing the data they receive.
3.2 Use of DTN
In order to reach a destination outside of the disaster area
(the “outside world”) the messages can only hop from one
device to the other until one of the devices is in range of
the undamaged network infrastructure. This communica-
tion model lands itself very well to the store-carry-forward
paradigm of Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) [19]. Hence,
we propose a software architecture in which devices, in ab-
sence of network infrastructure, can enable a DTN stack – a
sort of disaster mode for phones and laptops. A DTN stack
gives us mechanisms to discover neighboring nodes, identify
the available communication media, and to package, store
and carry messages of others.
The DTN stack, however, leaves open the choice of rout-
ing protocol. There are many proposals for DTN routing
protocols [26, 29, 36, 16]. For our specific environment we
choose Epidemic Routing [36]. In epidemic routing, when
two nodes come in contact, they exchange all messages that
they do not already possess. We choose epidemic routing
for three main reasons. First, message latency is a critical
performance metric in disaster scenarios. Depending on the
content of the message it may really be a matter of life and
death. As long as there are enough buffers to store incom-
ing messages, epidemic routing guarantees optimal latency.
Second, we cannot make any a-priori assumptions on the
mobility of users or on the presence of regular patterns (e.g.,
bus schedules). Different types of disasters impose very dif-
ferent restrictions on the movement of people and cause dif-
ferent level of damage to the nodes. Thus, it rules out sev-
eral DTN routing protocols that leverage such assumptions
for more efficient message delivery. Third, many DTN rout-
ing proposals are tuned toward reaching a specially marked
destination node. However, within a disaster area, all mes-
sages are really destined to the “outside world” rather than a
specific destination. Once outside the disaster area the regu-
lar Internet protocols will carry the messages to the intended
destination. In this case, epidemic routing maximizes the
chances to reach the unknown and possibly variable set of
nodes with connectivity to the regular infrastructure.
At the same time, we note that the content-aware strate-
gies that we propose next are not tightly coupled to the epi-
demic routing. In other words, they can be used in conjunc-
tion with, and provide benefits for, other routing strategies.
3.3 Augmenting DTN with Content-Awareness
In order to limit message replication and reduce network
load, we use the message content to drive our forwarding
decision. Our system, called CARE (Content Aware Re-
dundancy Elimination), detects when a message is seman-
tically similar to another message, hence de-prioritize one
of them and transmits the other. De-prioritizing may mean
pushing that message (or “bundle" in DTN parlance) to the
back of the transmission queue or even marking it as “first-
to-discard” if memory buffers are full. To simplify the dis-
cussion, we assume that redundant content is dropped.
A different form of prioritizing messages was proposed
in MaxProp DTN routing protocol [18], and was shown to
out perform other DTN protocols. However, MaxProp is
based on the path likelihoods of nodes to a known destina-
tion based on historical data. The assumption of predictable
paths is not applicable in our disaster area setting.
The overall goal of our system is to ensure that maximum
amount of unique information is transmitted from the dis-
aster zone. In this regard, the novel aspect of our design is
to to incorporate content-aware redundancy elimination into
the DTN routing protocol.
N1M1	  
N1M2	  
N1M3	  
	  
Node	  2	  
Node	  1	  
Node	  3	  
N1M1	  
N1M3	  
N3M1	  
N3M2	  
	  
N1M1	  
N3M1	  
N3M2	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  ≈N1M2	  
Local	  
redundancy	  
elimina5on	  
N1M1	  ≈N3M1	  
Redundancy	  
elimina5on	  
across	  nodes	  
N1M1	  ,	  N1M3	  
N1M1	  
N3M1	  ,	  N3M2	   N1M1	  is	  not	  
exchanged	  
(DTN	  
rou5ng)	  
Figure 2: Augmenting DTN routing with content-awareness.
Traditional DTN routing uses globally unique message ids
to identify repeated content and avoids re-sending them. As
Fig. 2 shows, CARE augments DTN routing in two ways.
First, it enables a node to detect local redundancy. Node 1
detects that message N1M2 is identical to N1M1 and dis-
cards it. Node 1 then contacts Node 2 and sends only mes-
sages N1M1 and N1M3. It then comes in range with Node
3, but manages to deliver only N1M1, e.g., due to a short
contact time.
Node 3 generates its own messages N3M1 and N3M2.
When it contacts Node 1, it only sends N3M1 and N3M2,
since DTN routing identifies that N1M1 already exists by
comparing id. CARE further enables Node 2 to detect that
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messageN1M1 is similar to the newly receivedN3M1, there-
fore it drops the latter, saving buffer space and reduces mes-
sage flooding.
Overall, the proposed CARE architecture has the follow-
ing advantages over standard DTN routing:
• Redundant messages are first identified locally, thus avoid-
ing further propagation of redundant content.
• CARE extends id-based duplicate detection with seman-
tically redundant message detection across different nodes.
• Without any mechanism to identify redundant content,
overflowing buffers drop messages in a FIFO manner. In
CARE, redundant messages are dropped first enabling
storage of unique messages for longer durations. Thus,
more unique messages reach the destination.
• The power saved by lowering the number of transmitted
messages typically exceeds the power consumed for de-
tecting redundancy [17]. Prolonging the battery life of
the device by enabling efficient communication can have
direct impact on the person using it during the disaster.
4. CONTENT-AWARE IMAGE TRAFFIC RE-
DUCTION
This section provides a brief description of the methods
we use to detect that two images are “similar enough" so
that one of them can be dropped. We describe and evaluate
3 computer vision techniques. Subsequently we design a
hybrid method that tries to leverage the advantages of each
while minimizing their drawbacks.
4.1 SIFT
Scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT) [30] is an algo-
rithm that finds a representation of an image that captures
consistent properties that are invariant to image translation,
scaling, and rotation, and some illumination changes [13,
37]. The algorithm first finds interesting regions or key-
points, each of which is represented by a feature vector. A
keypoint is a region that might be identified because it has a
clear edge boundary, or because it is typically either brighter
or darker than its neighborhood. A typical image is repre-
sented using several thousands of feature vectors. Given this
representation, SIFT uses feature matching for image simi-
larity detection. For each keypoint in the first image, it finds
a matching “nearest” keypoint in the second image based on
the Euclidean distance between their feature vectors.
Consider two images i and j with corresponding feature
vectors vi and vj . SIFT finds m keypoints that match (seem
to capture the same region), and a smaller set m′ ≤ m of
keypoints that are most likely to be the same only viewed
from different angels. The SIFT similarity score Ssift is
then calculated using:
Ssift =
m′
m
If m > 8 (a common SIFT configuration) and Ssift > Tsift
then two images are identified as redundant.
4.2 pHash
A perceptual hash (pHash) [31] is a fingerprint of a mul-
timedia file derived from the content. pHash produces one
hash for the entire image without decomposing the image
into smaller elements, making it computationally cheap to
run. pHash is commonly used for copyright violation de-
tection because it is good at detecting when two images are
nearly identical, despite the introduction of small variations
such as watermarks and minor transformations. In particu-
lar, it generates a R = 64-bit feature vector using the Dis-
crete Cosine Transform (DCT) of the image. Let pi denote
the pHash vector for an image i. The similarity between two
images is calculated as
Sph = R−HammingDist(p1, p2)
where HammingDist is the usual Hamming distance, i.e., the
number of similar corresponding bits between the hashes.
We say that two images are redundant if Sph > Tph where
Tph is the cutoff threshold for pHash.
4.3 GIST
GIST [33] is a method used for scene detection. A scene
is defined as an image that has roughly at least 5 meters be-
tween the observer and the focal point. This differs from im-
ages of “objects" in which the objects are often at a hand’s
distance from the observer. GIST provides a representation
of a scene by using spectral and coarsely localized infor-
mation to describe the “shape of the scene". GIST uses a
set of perceptual dimensions (naturalness, openness, rough-
ness, expansion, ruggedness) to capture the dominant spatial
structure of a scene.
We include GIST in our study because it has the potential
to be useful in disasters involving fires, floods, or tornados.
Photos from such events could be of scenes with amorphous
elements (such as a spreading fire) that don’t have clearly
well defined edges (something that is important for methods
such as SIFT).
Let vi and vj be the GIST vectors representing images i
and j, respectively. The similarity measure of the two im-
ages is calculated as:
Sgist =
cov(vi, vj)
σ(vi) · σ(vj)
where cov is the covariance function and σ is the standard
deviation function. We consider two images to be similar if
Sgist > Tgist, where Tgist is the cutoff threshold for GIST.
4.4 Performance of Individual Methods
We now analyze the performance of these image similar-
ity detection methods on our datasets. The configuration of
each method, i.e. the setting of the threshold parameters
Tsift, Tph, Tgist will determine its false positive and false
negative performance. When the detector makes a false neg-
ative (FN) mistake, it means that it failed to detect that two
images are indeed similar. A false positive (FP) mistake
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means that two different images were considered similar.
From the perspective of our SA application, an FP mistake is
far worse than an FN one, because an FP mistake means that
a piece of unique information will get dropped (or put in the
back of the queue) and might never reach the SA service.
An FN mistake merely means that our use of the available
bandwidth is less efficient than optimal because the network
will carry a piece of redundant content.
To understand the FP and FN tradeoffs for these 3 meth-
ods we generated ROC curves for each of them. Figures 3a
and 3b show the resulting curves when applied to the Haiti
and SDfire datasets respectively. Each point on the SIFT
curve corresponds to a particular threshold, Tsift, and we
sweep through many values to generate the full curve. The
pHash and GIST curves are created similarly by varying Tph
and Tgist, respectively. For each threshold value, we exam-
ined all pairs of images to determine whether or not the al-
gorithm deems them similar. Accuracy is computed against
our ground truth labels (from Sec. 2).
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Figure 3: ROC curves for three image similarity identifica-
tion methods
Fig. 3a shows that for the Haiti dataset both SIFT and
GIST performed reasonably well. With an FP rate of 5%,
SIFT can correctly identify over 75% of all true matches
and GIST can identify roughly 60%. Although the perfor-
mance of pHash is not superb, this is expected since pHash
is only good at identifying similarity when two images are
nearly identical. pHash is not robust to geometric transfor-
mations, distortions in luminance between images, nor im-
ages with only partial overlap. We note that for a low FP
rate of 1%, pHash can identify roughly 21% of the redun-
dant image pairs. In the next section, we see how this can be
leveraged when we design our hybrid method.
In Fig. 3b we see that these methods do not perform as
well on the SDfire data. At a 5% FP rate, SIFT cannot do
much more than detect about 42% of all the true matches,
while GIST correctly identifies about 35%. pHash performs
poorly. We believe that SIFT performs better on the Haiti
than the SDfire data because the Haiti photos often capture
an urban area, or areas with well defined objects such as
roads, cars, people, or buildings. The fires and smoke in
the SDfire data result in scenes whose elements are without
clear edges. We suspect that GIST has trouble here because
the images are not “pure" scenes but rather scenes often with
a small number of well defined objects. Fig. 4 provides an
illustration of the kinds of image pairs for which these tech-
niques either succeed or fail.
Overall, SIFT outperforms the other methods. However
SIFT is also computationally more expensive. Since hand-
helds during a disaster may be constrained by power, the cost
of these algorithms is a factor to consider when putting such
methods in the network layer.
In order to better understand their costs, we measured the
execution times of the three algorithms on two very different
platforms [2]: (i) a 1.6 GHz Atom 330 board with 2 GBytes
of RAM, and, (ii) an 8-core 2.8 GHz Xeon-based high end
server with 12 GBytes of RAM. We ran the three algorithms
on pairs of images in our datasets using the same (unmodi-
fied) code on the same operating system on both platforms.
Of course, the execution times on the two platforms are very
different but the absolute values are not that useful in guid-
ing design decisions in our system. In fact, the actual exe-
cution times are bound to change drastically every year as a
new generation of processors and devices enters the market.
Instead, a metric that can help us in the design of our sys-
tem is the ratio of execution times and whether those ratios
change significantly across platforms. The result of our in-
vestigation is that, as expected, SIFT is the most expensive
algorithm to run: the execution time of SIFT is on average
150x that of pHash while GIST is 50x that of pHash. We
also found that these ratios are quite consistent across the
Atom and Xeon-based platforms.
4.5 Pipeline Method
In order to balance the tradeoffs between FPs, FNs and
cost, we designed a hybrid method that combines these al-
gorithms in a pipeline as depicted in Fig. 5. We were mo-
tivated by cost issues, but also because these 3 algorithms
have different strengths and weaknesses, and we believe we
can leverage the strengths to reduce cost, while diminishing
some of the weaknesses.
6
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Examples of image pairs in the SDfire dataset, showing (a) an image pair that is successfully identified as redundant
by all methods, (b) an image pair that GIST incorrectly identifies as redundant, due to the apparent similarity of the scenes, and
(c) an image pair for which SIFT fails to identify the redundancy, due to the moving boundaries of the fire and smoke
We point out some behaviors of GIST and pHash that af-
fected our pipeline design. GIST sometimes wrongly iden-
tifies non-similar images as being similar, especially when
the scenes are similar but the details within them are differ-
ent (see Fig. 4b). However, since non-similar images often
capture different scenes, GIST actually does well at identi-
fying when two images are not similar. In other words, it is
easy to find a threshold Tgist such that when Sgist < Tgist
there is a high probability that the images are not similar.
pHash can only be used to identify images that are obvi-
ously similar (such as exact duplicates, or images that only
differ by a small amount of lighting or focus) and we can
avoid the heavy machinery of SIFT on the easy cases. (Al-
though pHash exhibits weak performance on our datasets,
we note that these are only two datasets and much remains
to be learned about SA datasets from disasters. We suspect
that datasets of the future could easily contain a great deal
of near-duplicate photos, and thus we include pHash in the
general design of our pipeline method.)
Because of these properties, we designed our pipeline method
as follows. A node is comprised of a single limited buffer
that holds feature vectors of images previously received by
the node and an outgoing message queue. When a new im-
age arrives, the pipeline first tests if it has metadata, such as
time or geo-tagging. Geo-tagging, using GPS or other forms
of positioning is becoming increasingly common in modern
cameras and handhelds. For example, in [21] the authors re-
port that roughly 10–15% of their city photos obtained from
Flickr are geo-tagged. The pipeline uses this data to decide
whether the image was taken too far away or too long ago
from any other image in its buffer, making an easy dissimi-
larity decision, thus adding it to its send queue. Otherwise,
the pipeline needs to run the algorithmic phases.
GIST first compares it to other images in the buffer. Be-
cause we only use GIST here to detect non-similarity, if
the image is different from all those in the buffer, then it is
added to the send queue. Otherwise, we assume GIST can-
not precisely identify whether the images are similar, hence
it forwards it to the next stage in the pipeline. By using
GIST to detect non-similarity, it means that all other deci-
sions (i.e., about similarity) are deferred to stages further
down the pipeline. This means that the pipeline incurs any
false negative mistakes GIST may make, but it does not in-
cur the FP mistakes GIST would normally make. Since de-
cisions about similarity are deferred down the pipeline, the
impact on FPs of the overall system will be influenced only
by pHash and SIFT (that do make decisions about similar-
ity). We put GIST first in the pipeline because the majority
of the pairs in our datasets are not redundant, and this re-
duces the overall cost since most images will not have to be
processed by SIFT.
The next phase uses pHash only to detect similarity. pHash
compares the current image to those in the buffer, and if
it decides it is similar, then the image is dropped or de-
prioritized. We configure pHash for a low FP rate, because
its FN behavior does not impact the pipeline’s overall perfor-
mance since pHash makes no decisions about non-similarity.
If a decision still has not been taken, SIFT processes the im-
age and makes a final decision regarding the redundancy of
the current image with those in the buffer. Intuitively, we
are using GIST and pHash to handle the easy cases (of non-
similarity and similarity, respectively), and we only use SIFT
for the non-obvious cases.
We also considered another hybrid method based upon us-
ing a decision tree. Using the results of each method in-
dividually, and the ground truth labels, we ran the WEKA
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data mining tool [23] to generate an optimal decision tree.
This method yielded an insignificant improvement in the FPs
and FNs. Because SIFT is the most accurate method, it was
elected to be at the top of the decision tree, which means that
it needs to run on all pairs mitigating possible improvements
in cost. We therefore decided not to pursue this method.
GIST	   pHASH	  
Not	  similar	   Not	  similar	  
Similar	  
Place	  image	  in	  transmit	  queue	  
De-­‐priori:ze	  image	  
SIFT	  
Meta	  
data	  
Filter	  
Image	  feature	  buffer	  
Image	   Similar	  
Not	  similar	  
Figure 5: Pipeline Method
Our goal is design a pipeline that achieves similar or better
accuracy (i.e., FP,FN) at a lower cost, than the best single
method.
To study the performance of the pipeline we considered
some sample scenarios on our Haiti dataset. Recall that in
our pipeline method, we select thresholds for GIST based
upon a target FN rate (since it only decides about non-similarity)
and for pHash based on a target FP rate (since it only decides
on similarity). SIFT is configured for a target FP rate be-
cause we consider FPs more important than FNs in the over-
all system. Hence we found thresholds so that FNgist=30%,
FPpHash=1% and FPsift=1%.
Table 2 shows the FP, FN and cost of each of the indi-
vidual methods and of the pipeline method. We normalize
the cost by the cost of running pHash. Let Ni be the num-
ber of image comparisons conducted at stage i. Let ci be
the cost of running the algorithm at stage i. Then the av-
erage cost of similarity identification using the pipeline is
given by (N1c1 + N2c2 + N3c3)/N1 (note that N1 is the
total number of image pairs that need to processed in any
singleton method). In the upper part of the table, we see
that the pipeline method’s FP and FN performance are close
to SIFT (the best singleton method), yet the pipeline incurs
about half the cost. We also consider a slightly different sce-
nario in which pHash and SIFT are configured as before,
but GIST is now configured for a FNgist=10% (GIST-2 and
Pipeline-2 in the table). In this case the pipeline exceeds the
performance of any single method, however the cost gain is
more modest (roughly 15% improvement).
5. DISASTER SCENARIO SIMULATION
In order to understand the performance of CARE in a dis-
aster scenario, we used the Opportunistic Network Environ-
Method FP FN Normalized cost
pHash 0.01 0.83 1
GIST 0.15 0.30 50
SIFT 0.01 0.48 150
Pipeline 0.03 0.46 70
GIST-2 0.55 0.10 50
Pipeline-2 0.01 0.37 130
Table 2: Comparison between the pipeline approach and the
individual algorithms.
ment (ONE) [27] simulator, which is a DTN simulator. We
augmented this tool with an implementation of CARE, and
a message generation process that allows us to control the
amount of redundancy in the data – thereby enabling sensi-
tivity analysis.
5.1 Scenario Settings
We chose to simulate a disaster scenario in Pittsburgh,
USA because the ONE simulator comes with a detailed map
of Pittsburgh,1 that includes all the roads and bus routes.
We focus on a neighbourhood called Oakland, that covers
roughly an area of 10 miles by 8 miles. We consider a sce-
nario with 50 people randomly located inside the disaster
area. A single rescue vehicle travels between the disaster
area and a communication gateway (in a different part of the
city), that represents the only device that has Internet con-
nectivity (e.g., satellite), and is located roughly 6 miles out-
side of the disaster area. Although we term the vehicle trav-
eling in and out of the disaster area a rescue vehicle we note
that it could simply be an individual in the area who has the
means and potential to move in and out of the disaster zone.
We generate messages ourselves in the simulator, rather
than feed in our datasets as input, because we wish to control
the level of redundancy for sensitivity evaluation. At each
epoch, the simulator randomly selects a person that gen-
erates a 300KB message with a unique identifier, targeted
towards the communication gateway. 300 KB represents a
typical photo at a relatively low resolution. A message is
generated once every G seconds, so that during a simula-
tion of T seconds there will be T/G messages generated.
Let Mi denote a message i, and Rsim denote the percent of
message redundancy in the set of overall messages produced
during an experiment. When the simulator decides to add
a redundant message it selects a random message Mi at a
random user, and places the redundant message in the user’s
message stream as though it occurred shortly before or after
Mi was generated. In particular, we use a time window that
started 20 seconds before Mi, or that ended 20 seconds after
Mi. This allows us to simulate temporal locality, which we
expect will occur often in such disaster scenarios.
People walk at a speed uniformly distributed in the range
of 3–7 Km/h (2–5 mph). The people move in a point-of-
interest map-based shortest path traversal, meaning each per-
son selects a destination point inside the disaster area and
1The Pittsburgh map was contributed to The ONE by PJ Dillon,
http://www.cs.pitt.edu/~pdillon/one/
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finds the shortest path using roads to get there. Once the
person reached its destination it stops for 5 minutes, and then
repeats this process.
Each person has a WiFi-enabled device, transmitting to a
maximal range of 20 meters in 10Mbps, simulating a smart-
phone. This device also has a limited buffer used for storing
messages that the person creates or receives from others. We
denote the size of the buffer in the people device by Bpeople.
The rescue vehicle drives at a speed uniformly distributed
in the range of 25–54 Km/h (15–33 mph). The rescue vehi-
cle selects whether to go to the disaster area or go back to
the communication gateway. We denote the probability of
selecting a destination within the disaster area as Prdisaster,
which is independent from the current location of the rescue
vehicle. Once selected to go to the disaster area, the rescue
vehicle selects a random point within it, drives there, and
once reached, it waits 5–10 minutes at that location before
selecting a new destination.
The rescue vehicle is equipped with a 100Mbps WiFi de-
vice, also transmitting to a maximal range of 20 meters.
This device enables the rescue vehicle to communicate mes-
sages with people at a maximal bandwidth of 10Mbps and
with the communication gateway at a maximal bandwidth
of 100Mbps. We denote the size of the buffer of the rescue
vehicle as Brescue.
When two devices are in contact range they exchange all
the messages that they have and the other party does not
have, in a FIFO order. We implemented CARE into the ONE
simulator, and created a CARE epidemic router. The CARE
routers exchange messages using the normal epidemic flood-
ing, except that when it receives a message which is similar
to a message it already has in its buffer, it does not accept the
new message (for simplicity, we implement a drop policy for
redundant content without de-prioritization).
A CARE router in the simulator receives three parame-
ters – buffer size, FP rate (FPR) and FN rate (FNR). When
FP> 0, and a received message is not similar to any message
in the buffer, the router mistakenly identifies the messages as
similar with probability FP, causing the new message to be
dropped. Similarly, When FN> 0, and a received message is
similar to one of the messages in its buffer, the router mistak-
enly identifies the messages as non similar with probability
FN, which results in occupying more space in its buffer and
sending both of them.
5.2 Results
In this section we seek to explore the range of network
parameters in which CARE brings benefits. In order to un-
derstand the interesting operating region for CARE, we first
describe two extreme cases. The overall capacity of our sys-
tem to deliver messages is defined by numerous parameters,
including the message generate rate, the buffers, the con-
tact opportunities, the bandwidth, the data exchange among
nodes, and so on. At one extreme, if the aggregate capacity
of the system is much higher than the offered load, then it
is capable of storing and transmitting all the messages that
are created, and hence there would be no need for CARE
capabilities. At the other extreme, when the system capac-
ity is extremely low, there is not enough storage and band-
width to carry even the unique information to its destination,
thus CARE brings little or no added value. We study oper-
ating regimes in between these two extremes and focus on
the impact to performance of the level of redundancy in the
data, and the contact opportunities with the rescue vehicle.
We sometimes compare our system to one without CARE,
called non-RE, in which messages are served (and dropped
when necessary) in FIFO manner.
We set the buffer size of the people devices, Bpeople to be
able to include exactly all the unique messages that are gen-
erated. Recall that each message is 300KB, and G is the in-
terval between messages, the buffer of each person has a size
of: Bpeople = 300KB · (1−Rsim) · T/G. We selected this
approach to buffer sizing as an attempt to run experiments in
operating regions where the overall system capacity is not in
either of the two extremes described above. (However, the
buffer size is not the only parameter affecting whether or not
we end up in the extremes.) The rescue vehicle has a fixed
1GB buffer.
First, we illustrate the impact of CARE on the delivery
of unique messages. As an example, we ran an experiment
with T = 5 hours of simulation time, and Rsim = 30%.
Fig. Fig. 6a shows the number of unique messages that reach
the communication gateway with and without CARE over
the duration of the simulation run. The stairs in the plot
are exchanges of messages between the rescue vehicle and
the communication gateway. During the first few, the of-
fered load (i.e., total number of messages in the system) is
small enough to be completely stored and delivered both
with and without CARE. However, as more messages are
generated and duplicated with epidemic routing, the buffers
fill up and messages are dropped. In the non-RE setting,
both unique and redundant messages get dropped, whereas
in the CARE setting, only redundant messages get dropped
since each buffer is capable of holding all unique messages
and there are zero FN mistakes. In this example, we see 3
exchanges (at times 130, 180 and 260 minutes) where the
rescue vehicle is able to deliver a larger number of unique
messages with CARE than without it. In the final exchange
between the rescue vehicle and the communication gateway,
there are roughly 200 more unique messages that manage to
get through when CARE is used, which are roughly 17% of
the total messages generated.
In order to quantify the improvement that CARE brings in
delivery of unique information to the outside world we de-
fine the following. Let NCAREi be the total number of mes-
sages (including redundant messages) that reach the destina-
tion gateway for a specific simulation run i with CARE, and
UCAREi be the total number of unique messages (without re-
dundant messages). Similarly, letNNon−REi and U
Non−RE
i
be the total number of messages and the number of unique of
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Figure 6: Simulation results, showing (a) an illustrative 5 hour run with 30% redundancy, (b) percent of improvement in unique
message delivery over non-RE for different Rsim values, and (c) total number of dropped messages for different Rsim values
messages respectively, in an identical but non-RE simulation
setting. The improvement is then given by:
%Improvment = 100 · U
CARE
i − UNon−REi
UNon−REi
Fig. 6b plots the improvement for both various redun-
dancy levels, and in terms of the percent of time that the res-
cue vehicle spent at the disaster zone. We vary the percent of
time by changing the value of Prdisaster. First we observe
that the improvement increases as the redundancy in the traf-
fic increases, implying that the more redundancy there is,
the more benefits CARE brings. The performance is also a
clearly function of how the the rescue vehicle partitions its
time between the disaster zone and the outside world. When
the time in the disaster zone is too low, the improvement is
lower than 7%, mainly since there are not enough opportu-
nities to convey information from the people in the disaster
zone to the outside gateway. When the time in the disaster
zone reaches 30% to 40% we seem to be in a good operating
region as there are enough contact opportunities for smart
dropping to take advantage of. In this region, we see an im-
provement ranging from 20% when Rsim = 40% to 40%
with Rsim = 60%.
We can see the effect of smart dropping via CARE in
Fig. 6c, which shows the total number of message drops,
i.e., drops that occur in the buffers of all devices, when FIFO
dropping is used. Looking at Figures 4b and 4c, it becomes
clear that the improvement occurs because the drops under
FIFO are poor, whereas under CARE unique information is
not lost. The number of drops goes down as the rescue ve-
hicle is spending enough time in the disaster zone, and also
has sufficient opportunities to convey the collected messages
to the outside.
The reason the number of drops increases with redun-
dancy even in the non-RE setting is that the buffer sizeBpeople
is targeted to hold only unique messages, enabling zero FIFO-
related drops in all CARE settings. The more redundancy in
the dataset, the smaller the buffer and more drops are wit-
nessed in non-RE settings.
Next we examine the impact of CARE on message de-
livery time (latency), i.e., the time it takes a message to
reach the communication gateway. Fig. 7a shows an empir-
ical CDF of message latency, for different levels of redun-
dancy. In the case with 60% data redundancy, then we see
that CARE can deliver the messages with significantly less
latency than a non-RE system. With CARE, 60% of the mes-
sages will be delivered in under 100 minutes, while without
CARE, those messages will require 140 minutes. Roughly
50% of the messages will see almost 30 minutes improve-
ment in median latency (over 17% of the maximal latency).
This occurs because unique messages in a FIFO system will
get stuck in buffers behind redundant messages, whereas this
does not happen with CARE. We also see that as the redun-
dancy increases, CARE brings increasing benefits, as it re-
duces the overall latency of messages. Note that even when
running non-RE with the largest buffer size, which is ob-
tained using 20% redundancy, its delivery time was smaller
than all CARE simulations.
We note that in the above figures, we considered a version
of CARE in which the image similarity detection is optimal
and does not make mistakes. We considered this scenario
only in order to isolate the effects of message redundancy,
and rescue vehicle contact opportunities. This is important
because there are so many parameters that ultimately affect
the timely delivery of unique messages, and it is challenging
to understand the impact of each. Next we considered non-
optimal CARE based upon today’s more realistic computer
vision methods (although we are convinced that the perfor-
mance of such algorithms will improve in the near future).
Fig. 7b explores the impact of mistakes in image similarity
detection on the delivery time, using a 4 hour simulation,
40% redundancy and a fixed FP rate of 1%. Additionally,
for these simulations we also made the buffer of the rescue
vehicle to be exactly the same size of the buffer of the peo-
ple’s devices, making the rescue vehicle capable of storing
exactly all the unique messages in the system. The figure
shows that the FN rate has little impact on the message deliv-
ery times, and for all FN rates, CARE results in consistently
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Figure 7: CDFs of message delivery statistics, showing (a)
delivery time using varying redundancy levels, (b) delivery
time of pipeline CARE. Plot (b) uses 40% redundancy and
FP rate of 1%
better deliver times than non-RE. Although FN mistakes in-
crease the number of messages that traverse the network, the
overall FN rate is still relatively small, resulting in much less
messages, which again reduces the load on the buffers.
5.3 Summary of Key Results
To summarize, our evaluation shows that:
• CARE delivers roughly 20% more unique information
than a system without CARE.
• The more redundancy there is, the greater benefits CARE
brings. For example, we saw 20 to 40% improvement, for
redundancy ranging from 40 to 60% (note that our SDfire
dataset falls in this range).
• CARE not only delivers more unique information, but
also does so in a more timely fashion. In our scenarios,
we saw latencies reduced by 33%.
• Finally, CARE provides significant benefits even with
imperfect image similarity detection, and a conservative
pipeline (i.e. don’t drop messages until they passed nu-
merous similarity checks). Even with false negative rates
of 10, 20 or 30%, CARE still delivers more unique mes-
sages with lower latency than a non-RE system.
6. RELATED WORK
PhotoNet [35] presents a context-based redundancy elim-
ination routing scheme that is motivated by the same sce-
nario described in this paper, however, their work differs in
key ways from ours. First, their method for assessing sim-
ilarity in images is entirely different than ours. PhotoNet
heavily relies on geo-tagging and photos within a short dis-
tance of each other are considered similar. To differentiate
images from the same area, PhotoNet assesses similarity us-
ing color histograms. Although this approach has advan-
tages computationally, it won’t disguish critical differences
for disaster relief. Consider as examples i) one person tak-
ing 2 photos in the same place but turned 180 degrees in the
second photo relative to the first. Although the color tones
in an area plagued by fires or hurricanes might be overall
similar, the objects in the images will be different; ii) a burn-
ing house with no person in front is different than the same
burning house with a policeman in front; the latter indicates
that help is nearby and should be considered more impor-
tant. The kinds of computer vision algorithms that we em-
ploy are able to do object extraction and thus provide funda-
mentally different options for assessing the notion of image
similarity or importance. Moreover, even though most mo-
bile phones nowadays have geo-tagged functionality, with-
out the presence of cellular network this functionality relies
on GPS, which consumes large amounts of battery power,
thus will likely be turned off in a disaster scenario. Sec-
ond, the work in [35] does not motivate why redundancy
occurs, nor evaluate their protocol on real disaster data. In
our work, we demonstrate the existance of redundacy in dis-
aster photo data, and we believe that our work is the first to
evaluate this approach on real data. A third key difference
is the movement model. The authors proposed a model that
assumes repetitive movement of people and rescue teams.
This model increases the opportunities for redundancy elim-
ination, which benefits the results of the simulation. We take
a more conservative approach, and assume a random move-
ment with only the rescue vehicle having a partially repet-
itive movement. We also explore a range of parameter set-
tings to study under which operating conditions an approach
like CARE brings benefits.
In [14] the author studies a similar scenario as ours in
which a victim in a disaster zone is only allowed to send a
limited number of small messages outside the disaster zone.
The study focuses on how to set up a system in advance to
allow a pre-specified set of people to receive such messages,
and how to make the message upload procedure secure from
malicious impersonation. There has been a large body of
work on wireless protocols for emergencies, however that
area of research is completely distinct from the discussion
here that assumes that once a contact opportunity occurs the
underlying wireless protocol (WiFi in this case) will work.
In the last few years, a number of techniques have been
developed to identify and remove strings of bytes that are
repeated across network packets (e.g., [15]). These tech-
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niques for traffic redundancy elimination are content agnos-
tic, and because they look for repeating byte patterns, these
techniques have been primarily applied to network traffic
flows and files. Because our focus is on a different media
type, namely photos, content-agnostic techniques offer lit-
tle potential to further reduce the size of such content be-
cause it is already compressed (e.g. JPEG) or because small
differences in photos (e.g. even illumination) will gener-
ate different underlying bit-patterns of the digitized image.
We demonstrated this in Sec. 2.2. For photos and video
alike, content-aware techniques are needed for redundancy
identification. Previous efforts [15] have argued for integrat-
ing the traffic agnostic redundancy elimination methods into
network infrastructure and protocols. Our paper pushes this
notion even further by advocating for incorporating content-
aware RE into network infrastructure to handle redundancy
of a broader set of media types.
In [39] the authors design a system called iScope for per-
sonal image management on mobile devices. They employ
similar techniques such as SIFT to enable content-based im-
age search, both on a person’s own device and across a set
of devices. Their goal is to enable rapid image search while
designing to meet power constraints. While [39] employs
similar image similarity detection methods, both their appli-
cation setting and their constraints are distinct from ours.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we explored the idea of using content-aware
redundancy elimination in the forwarding decision of the
networking layer. We proposed CARE, an architecture that
combines such traffic reduction with existing DTN proto-
cols. This system is suited for emerging situational aware-
ness applications that empower ordinary citizens during dis-
aster events. We believe this is an interesting emerging area
because the use of the Web to provide SA during disasters
is a trend that will continue to gain momentum – especially
since the Internet has already proven effective in disaster re-
sponse. There is a great deal of effort in developing compo-
nents of the ecosystem for such systems, including crisis re-
sponse data formats [12], visualization techniques [22], por-
tals [28], and more. Many of the networking and systems
issues surrounding information overload, congestion, power
consumption, collaborative decision making, data sharing,
security and privacy have yet to be fully understood.
Our study shows that incorporating solutions from image
processing into the forwarding path has a number of benefits.
In the face of congestion, we enable more unique informa-
tion to escape from disaster zones when contact opportuni-
ties are sporadic and unpredictable. We illustrated a disaster
scenario in which up to 40% improvement in the delivery
of unique information can be attained using CARE. We also
showed that CARE decreases the latency of non-redundant
messages, compared to a system without redundancy elimi-
nation. For many of the messages in our scenarios, the de-
livery time to the SA service can be increased by 30 minutes
to over an hour.
We discuss that using image processing this way incurs a
cost on people’s mobile devices; plus image similarity detec-
tion methods are not perfect and do make mistakes. We de-
signed a pipeline system that combines multiple algorithms
to balance the cost-accuracy tradeoff. We show that such
a system can be used either with similar (FP,FN) perfor-
mance as the best single method but at much lower cost
(roughly half), or it can be used with with better performance
all around (FP,FN,cost) but where the cost gains are in the
15% range. We believe that the algorithms from the image
processing community will continue to improve in accuracy,
and thus such systems will become even higher performing
in the future.
We plan to expand our work to other disaster scenarios,
and to further evaluate the impact of our design on other
constraints such as power since energy is a critical resource
in battery powered mobile devices. We also plan to gener-
alize our architecture to include other types of multimedia
data. In this paper, we focused on content-aware reduction
for photos in disasters where the incentive for content-aware
reduction is motivated by intermittent resources to transport
the content, and because of the known existence of semantic
redundancy in the data. We believe however that our ap-
proach could be made broader as there is potential to apply
it to other problem scenarios of information overload in net-
works, not related to disasters.
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